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   For	   many	   foreign	   affair	   pundits	   the	   unilateral	   annexation	   of	   Crimea	   by	   Russia	   is	  evidence	   that	  U.S.-­‐Russian	   relations	   have	   completely	   broken	   down.	  Many	  Western	  media	  outlets,	   and	   state	   leaders,	   have	   argued	   that	   this	  breakdown	   in	   relations	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	  actions	  being	  pursued	  by	  Russia	   in	  attempting	   to	   regain	   some	  of	   its	   ‘old	  glory’	  or	  Putin’s	  desire	  to	  recreate	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  As	  will	  be	  argued,	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  NATO	  since	  the	  early	  90’s	  has	  led	  to	  a	  breakdown	  in	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations.	  While	   the	  1990s	  did	   see	  a	  hope	  arise	   that	  Russia	  may	   Minally	   align	  with	   the	  West	   and	   its	  foreign	  policies,	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  have	  gradually	  shown	  this	  utopic	  idea	  to	  be	  false	  due	  to	   the	   realpolitik	   nature	   that	   is	   inherent	   in	   U.S.-­‐Russian	   dealings	   over	   key	   foreign	   affair	  issues.	   Three	   areas	   will	   be	   examined	   to	   show	   what	   has	   led	   to	   this	   deterioration	   in	  relationship	  between	   the	  U.S.	   and	  Russia.	  The	   Mirst	   section	   to	  be	  examined	   is	   the	   issue	  of	  NATO	  expansion	  and	  the	  illegal	  granting	  of	  independence	  to	  the	  former	  Serbian	  province	  of	  Kosovo.	  Nearly	   two	  decades	   of	   continual	  NATO	   and	  European	  Union	   expansion	   into	   East	  Europe	  and	  the	  Baltic	  region	  has	  left	  Russia	  feeling	  uneasy	  towards	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	   has	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   combative	   attitude	  within	   the	   Russian	   government	  towards	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies.	  The	  second	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  explore	  how	  Russia	  has	  reacted	  to	  Western	  policies	  towards	  the	  integration	  of	  Ukraine	  and	  Georgia	  into	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe’s	   geopolitical	   sphere	   of	   inMluence.	   While	   historically	   under	   the	   control	   and	  inMluence,	   both	   countries	   have	   begun	   to	   lean	   towards	   integration	   into	   NATO	   and	   the	  European	  continent.	  Knowing	  that	  this	  situation	  is	  untenable,	  Russia	  has	  used	  both	  military	  and	  economic	  force	  to	  compel	  both	  states	   into	  submission.	  The	  Minal	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  examine	  the	  new	  arms	  race	  that	  is	  developing	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	  in	  regards	  to	  the	   establishment	   of	   ballistic	  missile	   defence	   and	   offensive	   capabilities.	   The	  decisions	   by	  the	   U.S.	   to	   institute	   a	   Ballistic	  Missile	   Defence	   Shield	   in	   Europe,	   to	   protect	   U.S.	   interests	  from	  ‘rogue	  states,’	  and	  step	  away	  from	  the	  Anti-­‐Ballistic	  Missile	  Defence	  Treaty	  of	  1972	  has	  been	  met	  with	   contempt	   and	   distrust	   by	   the	   Russian	   government.	   Russian	   fears	   revolve	  around	   the	   belief	   that	   such	   a	   defence	   mechanism	   could	   be	   used	   to	   nullify	   Russia’s	  advantage	  in	  ballistic	  missiles	  and	  nuclear	  warheads.	  In	  response,	  Russia	  has	  begun	  to	  re-­‐militarize	  its	  border	  regions	  with	  Europe	  and	  re-­‐deploy	  its	  ICBM	  launchers.	  	  	   Before	  delving	  into	  the	  topic	  areas	  discussed	  above,	  an	  account	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  early	  90’s	  must	  be	  examined	  to	  show	  where	  the	  decline	  in	  U.S.-­‐Russian	  relations	  began	  and	  what	  were	  the	  reasons	  that	  set	  off	  this	  confrontative	  chain	  of	  events.	  Two	  issues	  are	  of	  note:	  President	  Clinton’s	  decision	  not	  to	  work	  with	  Russia	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  arms	  and	  Russia’s	  view	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  settlement	  had	  been	  abandoned	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies.	  Following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  given	  two	  choices	  as	  to	  what	  path	  could	  be	  taken	  in	  regards	  to	  U.S.	  dealings	  with	  Russia:	  either	  make	  a	  serious	  attempt	  at	   integrating	  Russia	   into	  the	  Western	  System	  or	  begin	  expanding	   into	   its	   former	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sphere	   of	   inMluence	   in	   Eastern	   Europe. 	   The	   U.S.,	   under	   the	   Clinton	   Presidency,	   began	   to	  1develop	  a	  foreign	  policy	  based	  on	  the	  latter	  of	  these	  two	  paths.	  This	  was,	  in	  part,	  the	  result	  of	   how	   the	  West	   viewed	   Russia	   during	   this	   period.	   Inclusion	   of	   Russia	   into	   the	   security	  order	  of	  Europe	  was	  hard	  to	  imagine	  due	  to	  Russia’s	  unstable	  government	  during	  the	  90’s	  and	   its	   inability	   to	  decide	  whether	   its	   identity	  was	   that	  of	  being	  a	  part	  of	   the	  West	  or	   in	  opposition	   to	   the	  West. 	   	   Based	   on	   this,	   the	  U.S.	   began	   to	   develop	   its	   policy	   towards	   the	  2expansion	   of	   NATO	   into	   Eastern	   Europe	   and	   beyond.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   expansion	  was	  outlined	   by	   the	   U.S.’s	   Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Strobe	   Talbot.	   Talbot	   argued	   that	   NATO	  expansion	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	   incentive	   for	   the	  nations	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  strengthen	  democratization	  and	   legal	   institutions,	  ensure	  civilian	  control	  of	  armed	  forces,	  liberalize	   market	   economies,	   respect	   human	   rights,	   and	   additionally,	   resolve	   disputes	  peacefully	  and	  contribute	  to	  peace	  keeping	  operations. 	   	  While	  this	  move	  was	  approved	  by	  3Clinton,	   the	  European	  partners	  of	   the	  U.S.,	  and	  the	  general	  American	  public,	  specialists	   in	  the	   areas	   of	  U.S	   arms	   control	   and	   foreign	  policy	  believed	   that	   the	  policy	  would	   lead	   to	   a	  division	  in	  Europe	  and	  see	  Russia	  step	  away	  from	  cooperation	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  START	  I	  and	  START	   II. 	   By	   pushing	   for	   this	   policy	   initiative,	   they	   feared	   that	   the	   U.S.	   would	   alienate	  4Russia	  and	   jeopardize	   the	  relationship	   that	  had	  been	  developing	  since	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Under	   Clinton,	   the	   U.S.	   and	   its	   Western	   partners	   gave	   the	   green	   light	   to	   the	  acceptance	  of	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  and	  Czech	  Republic	  to	  become	  full-­‐Mledged	  members	  of	  the	  Atlantic	   organization.	   These	   three	   states	   were	   optimally	   the	   best	   candidates	   for	   initial	  NATO	  expansion	  due	  to	  several	  reasons:	  acceptance	  of	   these	  three	  states	   into	  the	  alliance	  was	  a	  sellable	   idea	   to	   the	  U.S.	   senate;	   the	  U.K.	   favoured	   letting	   in	  only	  a	  select	  number	  of	  states	   at	   a	   time;	   and	  Germany	  wanted	   to	   create	   a	   buffer	   zone	   that	   separated	   it	   from	   the	  front	   lines	   that	   it	   historically	   shared	   with	   Russia. 	   	   While	   the	   Western	   states	   saw	   the	  5incorporation	   of	   these	   three	   states	   as	   a	   diplomatically	   opportune	   move,	   Russia	   did	   not	  agree	   with	   this	   view.	   Unable	   to	   have	   much	   of	   an	   effect	   on	   the	   proceedings,	   due	   to	   the	  weakness	  of	   its	   state	  and	   its	   inability	   to	  project	   its	  power	  on	   the	   candidates,	  Russia	  only	  had	  the	  power	  to	  vent	  its	  disappointment	  with	  the	  West	  and	  warn	  that	  in	  the	  future	  Russia	  would	  not	  tolerate	  further	  Western	  interference	  in	  the	  old	  domains	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Russia’s	   deteriorating	   view	   of	   the	   West	   centralized	   around	   the	   issues	   of	   NATO	  expansion	   and	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   Russian	   people	   had	   been	   abandoned	   by	   the	  West.	   The	  expansion	  of	  NATO	  became	  a	  hot	  topic	  for	  the	  Russian	  government	  and	  its	  elite	  due	  to	  their	  perception	   that	  NATO’s	  expansion	  eastward	  was	  an	  aggressive	  move	   intended	   to	   restrain	  Russia’s	   inMluence	   in	   the	   region.	   This	   puzzled	   and	   angered	   Russian	   ofMicials	   because,	   up	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until	  the	  point	  of	  NATO	  expansion,	  Russia	  had	  worked	  to	  create	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  West	   and	   believed	   that	   the	  West	   had	  made	   promises	   not	   to	   expand	   the	   alliance	   into	  Eastern	   Europe. 	   Then	   Russian	   President	   Boris	   Yeltsin	   believed	   that	   he	   had	   come	   to	   an	  6agreement	  with	  the	  West	  that	  neither	  NATO,	  nor	  the	  EU,	  would	  expand	  into	  the	  territories	  that	  were	  formally	  under	  the	  sphere	  of	  inMluence	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  While	  Yeltsin	  believed	  he	  had	  come	  to	  a	  settlement	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  promise	  given	  to	  Yeltsin	  was	  never	  explicitly	  made	   or	   used	   to	   form	   a	   binding	   agreement	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   eastward	   expansion. 	  When	  7NATO	  began	  its	  process	  of	  expansion	  into	  Eastern	  Europe	  the	  Russian	  elite	  were	  left	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  betrayal	  and	  alienation	  as	  the	  organization	  that	  was	  once	  used	  to	  wall	  off	  Soviet	  expansion	  and	  inMluence	  into	  Western	  Europe	  began	  moving	  into	  territories	  that	  had	  played	  a	   historical	   role	   for	   Russia	   in	   the	   past.	   NATO’s	   expansion	   eastward	   resulted	   in	   Russia	  becoming	  more	  combative	  and	  disproving	  of	  NATO	  and	  its	  role	  in	  European	  security. 	  Just	  8as	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  organization	  was	  being	  developed	  to	  once	  again	  deal	  with	  Russia.	  	  While	   the	   issue	   of	   NATO	   expansion	   played	   a	   role	   in	   reinforcing	   Russia’s	   more	  combative	  stance	  towards	  the	  West,	  and	  speciMically	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  feeling	  of	  betrayal	  created	  a	  belief	  that	  Russia	  had	  once	  again	  become	  alienated	  from	  the	  West.	  This	  view	  came	  about	  due	   to	   the	   perception	   that	   Russia	   had	   been	   abandoned	   by	   the	  West	   during	   its	   years	   of	  economic	   turmoil.	   Under	   Yeltsin’s	   economic	   liberalization	   reforms	   Russia’s	   economic	  stability	   collapsed	   as	   the	   state	   was	   unable	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   resulting	   pressures	   of	   his	  reforms.	   In	   the	   span	   of	   only	   a	   few	   years	   Russia’s	   economy	   had	   shrunk	   by	   half,	   causing	  political	   turmoil	   within	   the	   country. 	   	   Yeltsin	   had	   expected	   that	   the	   West	   would	   assist	  9Russia	  during	  this	  crisis,	  as	  he	  still	  believed	  that	  cooperation	  and	  integration	  into	  the	  West’s	  security	   organizations	  was	   possible.	   The	   assistance	   never	   reached	   the	   levels	   that	   Russia	  expected	   to	   receive	   from	   the	   West	   during	   the	   process	   of	   liberalization.	   During	   the	   G-­‐7	  summit	   of	   1992,	   Yeltsin	   called	   for	   a	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   of	   several	   billion	   into	   the	  Russian	  economy	  to	  help	   improve	   its	  economic	  performance;	  realistically,	   this	  was	  nearly	  impossible	   due	   to	   the	   domestic	   and	   economic	   issues	   that	   the	   U.S.	   and	   its	  Western	   allies	  faced	  at	  the	  time. 	   	  This	  perceived	  abandonment	  by	  the	  U.S	  and	  the	  West	  during	  Russia’s	  10gradual	   progress	   towards	   becoming	   a	   democratic	   and	   liberal	   state	   affected	   how	   Russia	  viewed	  the	  West	  and	  the	  relationship	  that	  they	  would	  have	  in	  the	  future.	  Yeltsin’s	  decision	  to	  resign	  in	  1999	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  Russia’s	  economy	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  90’s	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  relationship.	  Though	  there	  was	  some	  hope	  that	  things	  might	  change	  with	  the	  coming	  of	  Bush	  and	  Putin	  into	  their	  respective	  presidency,	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  followed	  the	  same	  deteriorating	  path	  of	  the	  90’s.	  In	  fact,	  the	  relations	   soon	   became	   combative	   as	   the	   newly	   elected	   President	   Vladimir	   Putin	   openly	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voiced	   his	   opposition	   towards	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   policies	   being	   made	   under	   the	   Bush	  presidency. 	  	  11Throughout	   the	   2000’s,	   the	   U.S-­‐Russian	   relation	   continued	   to	   be	   challenged	   by	  several	   issues:	   continued	   NATO	   expansion	   into	   Eastern	   Europe,	   Kosovo’s	   independence,	  and	   the	  U.S.’s	   growing	   inMluence	   over	  Ukraine	   and	  Georgia.	   The	   issue	   of	  NATO	  expansion	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Russia’s	  national	  security	  and	  a	  continual	  thorn	  that	  hampered	  its	  relationship	  with	   the	  U.S.	   and	   its	  Western	  allies.	  Kosovo’s	   independence	  became	  an	   issue	  between	   the	   two	   powers	   because	   of	   the	   differing	   views	   they	   had	   on	   the	   legality	   of	   its	  independence	   and	   the	   precedent	   it	   was	   setting	   in	   Europe.	   While	   the	   U.S.	   was	   the	   main	  architect	  for	  its	  independence,	  Russia	  vehemently	  denied	  that	  Kosovo	  should	  be	  considered	  a	   legal	  state	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  how	  Kosovo	  was	  able	  to	  attain	  its	   independence.	   	   In	  the	  cases	   of	   both	  Georgia	   and	  Ukraine,	   Russia	   disapproved	  NATO’s	   stance	   towards	   accepting	  both	  states	  as	  possible	  candidates	  for	  integration	  into	  the	  organization.	  As	  well,	  Russia	  was	  angered	  by	  both	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  satellite	  states	  attempt	  to	  align	  with	  the	  West	  through	  their	   consideration	   of	   joining	  NATO.	   To	   keep	   its	   authority	   in	   both	   of	   these	   states,	   Russia	  used	   economic,	   military	   and	   political	   force	   to	   ensure	   the	   alignment	   of	   both	   states	   with	  Russian	  interests.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Georgia,	  this	  eventually	  led	  to	  war	  in	  2008.	  Rather	   than	  heeding	   the	   indicators	   that	  Russia	  was	   giving	   out	   through	  diplomatic	  channels,	   the	   U.S.,	   under	   its	   newly	   elected	   President	   George	   Bush,	   continued	   to	   have	   its	  “open-­‐door	  policy”	  towards	  any	  states	  that	  were	  looking	  to	  join	  NATO. 	  	  While	  some	  of	  the	  12U.S.’s	  key	  European	  partners	  were	  hesitant	  about	  further	  expansion	  of	  NATO,	  the	  decision	  was	  made	   to	   accept	   the	   second	  phase	   of	  NATO	   expansion.	   In	   part,	   this	  was	   the	   result	   of	  Eastern	   European	   realpolitik	   analysts	   pushing	   for	  Western	   integration	   to	   protect	   against	  Russia	   and	   the	   appeal	   of	   charismatic	   Eastern	   European	   leaders	   to	   the	   U.S.	   public. 	   This	  13resulted	  in	  the	  states	  of	  Bulgaria,	  Estonia,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Romania,	  Slovakia	  and	  Slovenia	  being	  accepted	  into	  the	  alliance	  and	  integrated	  into	  NATO’s	  security	  system	  in	  2004.	  NATO’s	  Minal	   phase	   of	   expansion	  was	   Minished	   in	   2009	  with	   the	   addition	   of	   Albania	   and	   Croatia.	  While	   they	  had	  attempted	   to	  gain	  membership	   in	  2004,	   they	  were	  unable	   to	  due	   to	   their	  low	  levels	  of	  political	  stability	  and	  general	  unpreparedness	  of	  their	  militaries. 	  	  	  14Throughout	   this	   process,	   NATO	   expansion	   led	   to	   heightened	   tensions	   in	   Russia’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  West.	  As	  states	  joined	  the	  alliance,	  Putin	  frequently	  made	  statements	  that	   the	   process	  would	   damage	   Russian-­‐Western	   relations	   and	   that	   Russia	  would	   take	   a	  Mirmer	   stance	  against	   the	  West	   and	   its	   actions.	  During	  discussion	  on	   the	   second	  phase	  of	  membership	  into	  NATO,	  Putin	  was	  troubled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  and	  Estonia	  were	  being	  considered	  possible	  NATO	  members.	   In	  2000	  he	  went	  so	   far	  as	   to	   threaten	  to	  declare	  a	  “red	  line”	  if	  the	  Baltic	  States	  became	  a	  part	  of	  NATO,	  though	  he	  failed	  to	  followed	  through	   on	   this	   promise. 	   What	   set	   these	   three	   states	   apart	   from	   the	   other	   Eastern	  15
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European	   states	   looking	   to	   integrate	   closer	   to	   the	   West	   was	   their	   proximity	   to	   Russia’s	  borders	  and	  the	  sizeable	  ethnic	  Russian	  population	  that	  they	  have. 	  	  	  16Though	  Putin	  was	  not	  pleased	  with	  the	  actions	  of	  NATO,	  he	  was	  still	  willing	  to	  work	  with	   the	   U.S.	   during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   Bush’s	   presidency.	   Bush,	   likewise,	   attempted	   to	  cooperate	   with	   Russia	   on	   wide-­‐ranging	   issues	   of	   security	   and	   dealing	   with	   terrorist	  threats. 	   While	   this	   cooperation	   did	   help	   to	   rebuild	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	  17states	  to	  a	  degree,	  Putin	  soon	  became	  more	  combative	  towards	  the	  U.S.	  when	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  Bush	  was	  still	  not	  prepared	  to	  treat	  Russia	  as	  an	  equal	  partner.	  	  The	   issue	   that	   has	   come	   to	   revolve	   around	   the	   legality	   of	   whether	   Kosovo	   is	   an	  independent	   state	   came	   out	   of	   the	   collapse	   of	   Yugoslavia	   in	   the	   late	   90’s.	   Following	   its	  collapse,	   Yugoslavia	   became	   divided	   into	   several	   different	   states	   based	   on	   historical	  relevancies	   and	   ethnicities	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavian	   state.	   The	   situation	   soon	   became	  abysmal	   as	   ethnic	   tension	   led	   to	   war	   and	   ethnic	   cleansing	   between	   the	   newly	   founded	  states.	  This	  deteriorating	  situation	  resulted	  in	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  order	   and	   quell	   the	   unrest	   that	   had	   erupted	   in	   the	   region.	   In	   2008,	   the	   U.N.	   mandated	  province	  of	  Kosovo	  declared	  its	  independence	  from	  Serbia	  and	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  a	  majority	  of	  Western	  states.	  This	  unilateral	  decision	  on	  independence	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  West	  for	  several	  reasons.	  As	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  stated	  on	  the	  subject,	  “The	  unusual	  combination	  of	  factors	  found	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  situation	  –	  including	  the	  context	  of	   Yugoslavia’s	   breakup,	   the	   history	   of	   ethnic	   cleansing	   and	   crimes	   against	   civilians	   in	  Kosovo,	   and	   the	   extended	   period	   of	   U.N.	   administration	   –	   are	   not	   found	   elsewhere	   and	  therefore	  make	  Kosovo	  a	  special	  case.” 	  	  While	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  Western	  partners	  saw	  this	  as	  18a	   noble	   action	   to	   ensure	   the	   Kosovo	   people	   were	   not	   subjected	   to	   further	   ethnic	  discrimination	   or	   violence,	   Russia	   saw	   Kosovo’s	   independence	   as	   a	   violation	   of	  international	  law	  and	  a	  dilemma	  for	  states	  that	  were	  battling	  with	  breakaway	  regions.	  	  	  	  One	  of	  Russia’s	  main	  objections	  to	  Kosovo’s	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	   independence	  was	   that	   international	   law	  was	  not	   taken	   into	  account.	  By	  deciding	   to	  recognize	  Kosovo’s	  independence,	  the	  West	  opted	  to	  ignore	  the	  implications	  of	  secession	  and	  the	  consequences	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  Kosovo	  had	  for	  long-­‐standing	  autonomist	  and	  secessionist	  conMlicts	  in	  Europe	  and	   the	  world. 	  What	  Russia	   feared	   the	  most	  was	   that	   the	  model	  of	  decision-­‐19making	   process	   used	   in	   Kosovo’s	   independence	   could	   be	   used	   again	   by	   the	   West	   to	  legitimize	  secession	  movements	   in	  other	  states	  across	  Europe.	  As	  Putin	  stated	  publicly	   in	  2006,	  “[Kosovo]	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  immense	  importance	  for	  us,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  abiding	  by	  the	  principles	  of	   international	   law,	  but	   in	  terms	  also	  of	   the	  practical	   interests	  of	   the	  post-­‐Soviet	  area…” 	  Russia	  felt	  this	  keenly	  as	  the	  precedent	  of	  Kosovo	  could	  in	  theory	  allow	  the	  20West	   to	   intervene	   in	  Russia’s	  own	  secessionist	   troubles,	  mainly	   the	   issue	  of	  Chechnya.	  By	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the	  standard	  that	  Kosovo	  had	  set,	  it	  is	  now	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  U.N.	  to	  recognize	  states	  for	  them	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  legitimate	  body,	  as	  it	  only	  now	  requires	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  West.	  	  While	  the	  view	  that	  Kosovo	  was	  a	  unique	  circumstance	  that	  required	  a	  unique	  action	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  West,	  much	  of	  the	  world	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  decision	  to	  recognize	  the	  state	  of	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  independent	  entity.	  Several	  months	  following	  Kosovo’s	  declaration	  the	  U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  passed	  Resolution	  A/RES/63/3;	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  resolution	  was	  to	  allow	  Serbia	  to	  submit	  the	  question	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  Kosovo’s	  independence	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court. 	   	   Even	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	  21Western	   countries,	   Kosovo	   is	   still	   not	   recognized	   as	   an	   independent	   state	   due	   to	   the	  questions	   raised	  about	   its	   creation	  and	   the	  hesitancy	  of	  other	   states	  of	   the	  world	   to	  deal	  with	  it	  knowing	  that	  Kosovo	  creates	  a	  new	  precedence	  in	  state	  creation	  outside	  of	  following	  the	  laws	  and	  norms	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Though	   the	   decision	   by	   the	  U.S.,	   and	   its	  Western	   allies,	   to	   back	  NATO’s	   expansion	  and	   the	   independence	   of	   Kosovo	  was	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   deteriorating	   relations	   between	   the	  West	  and	  Russia,	  the	  abysmal	  relations	  we	  see	  today	  cannot	  be	  completely	  blamed	  on	  the	  West.	  Russia’s	  actions	  to	  ensure	  its	  inMluence	  in	  both	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine	  in	  the	  late	  2000’s	  angered	   the	  U.S.	  Though	   the	   two	  states	  wished	   for	   closer	   relations	  with	   the	  West,	  Russia	  saw	   this	   position	   as	  untenable	  due	   to	   the	   view	   that	   both	   states	  were	   integral	   to	  Russia’s	  image	  of	   itself	  as	  a	  great	  power	  and	  by	  the	  geo-­‐political	   importance	  that	  both	  states	  have	  played	  for	  Russian	  inMluence	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  cultural	  bond	  that	  Russia	  has	  with	  the	  Georgian	  people	  and	  the	  role	  that	  Georgia	  has	  played	  in	  being	  the	  economical	  lynchpin	   in	   trade	  between	   the	  South	  Caucasus	  states	  and	  Europe	  meant	   the	  Russia	  could	  not	  allow	  Georgia	   to	   fall	  outside	  of	   its	   inMluence,	  as	   this	  could	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  Russia’s	  position	   in	   the	   region. 	   	   Russia’s	   view	   that	   Ukraine	   is	   “Mother	   Russia’s”	   western-­‐most	  22province,	  and	  that	  it	  plays	  a	  strategic	  role	  in	  Russia’s	  position	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  creates	  the	  foundation	   for	   Putin’s	   hesitancy	   in	   regards	   to	   Ukraine’s	   growing	   relationship	   with	   the	  West. 	   Because	   of	   these	   considerations,	   Russia	   has	   taken	   a	   Mirm	   stance	   in	   ensuring	   that	  23both	  states	  do	  not	  sway	   to	   far	   from	  Russian	   inMluence.	  Fear	   that	  either	  state	  may	  become	  further	   integrated	   into	   Europe	   has	   resulted	   in	  Russia	   adopting	   economic	   embargoes	   and	  military	   intervention	   to	   ensure	   that	   both	   states	   fall	   in	   line	   with	   Russian	   demands	   and	  interests.	  Since	   the	   early	   2000’s,	   Putin	   has	   attempted	   to	   safeguard	  Russia’s	   inMluence	   in	   the	  two	  states	  through	  the	  use	  of	  either	  economic	  pressure	  or	  military	  force,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  both.	  The	  strategy	  that	  Russia	  has	  used	  on	  these	  states	  signiMicantly	  differs	  as	  to	  how	  far	  Russia	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives	  while	  dealing	  with	  the	  least	  amount	  of	   condemnation	   by	   the	  West.	   Fearing	   the	   possibility	   of	   closer	   Georgian-­‐Western	   ties,	   if	  Georgia	  continued	  on	  its	  path	  to	  becoming	  incorporated	  into	  NATO,	  Russia	  used	  the	  issue	  of	  South	   Ossetia	   as	   a	   pretext	   to	   invade	   Georgia	   and	   attempt	   to	   upset	   the	   Western-­‐leaning	  government	   that	  was	  presently	   in	  power.	  When	  Georgian	   forces	  began	   the	  bombardment	  on	  the	  capital	  of	  South	  Ossetia,	  Tskhinvali,	  the	  government	  of	  Russia	  used	  this	  as	  a	  pretext	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to	   join	   the	   conMlict	   on	   the	   side	  of	   the	  Ossetians.	  According	   to	   the	  Russian	   view,	  Georgia’s	  attack	   on	   the	   city	   put	   Russian	   peacekeepers	   in	   danger	   and	   threatened	   the	   Ossetian	  population	  with	  genocide. 	   	  Within	   a	   short	   amount	  of	   time,	  Russian	   forces	  were	  able	   to	  24rout	  the	  Georgians	  out	  of	  the	  North	  of	  their	  country	  and	  neared	  the	  capital	  Tbilisi.	  Before	  the	  war	   could	   escalate	   any	   further,	   Russia	   agreed	   to	   a	   truce	   ending	   the	   conMlict.	   Despite	  agreeing	   to	   the	  ceaseMire,	  Russia	  eliminated	  all	  military	   installations	  and	   infrastructure	   in	  the	  Northern	  regions	  of	  Georgia	  that	  were	  occupied,	  and	  declared	  the	  break-­‐away	  regions	  of	   South	   Ossetia	   and	   Abkhazia	   independent	   states	   protected	   by	   Russia	   from	   future	  Georgian	  aggression. 	  This	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  was	  an	  exact	  copy	  of	  the	  25action	  that	  the	  West	  had	  taken	  to	  give	  independence	  to	  Kosovo.	  Throughout	   the	   21st	   century,	   Russia	   has	   constantly	   used	   economic	   and	   political	  pressure	  to	  attain	  the	  outcomes	  that	  it	  desires	  within	  Ukraine.	  These	  actions	  have	  generally	  taken	   the	   form	   of	   cutting	   off	   Ukraine’s	   gas	   supply	   and	   getting	   deeply	   involved	   in	  parliamentary	  elections	  for	  Ukraine’s	  Presidency.	  Russia	  has	  on	  several	  occasions	  used	  the	  embargo	  of	  gas	  as	  a	  way	  to	  show	  its	  displeasure	  with	  the	  government	  of	  Ukraine.	  Following	  the	  resignation	  of	  President	  Leonid	  Kuchma	   in	  2005,	  Putin	  campaigned	   for	   the	  candidate	  Prime	  Minister	  Viktor	  Yanukovych	  to	  take	  ofMice. 	  Known	  for	  his	  pro-­‐Russian	  views,	  he	  was	  26seen	  as	  a	  candidate	   that	  would	  keep	  Ukraine	   in	   line	  with	  Russian	   interests.	  This	  decision	  backMired	   when	   Yanukovych’s	   opponent,	   Viktor	   Yushchenko,	   won	   the	   elections	   and	   led	  Ukraine	   on	   a	   path	   toward	   Western	   integration.	   The	   pro-­‐Western	   actions	   taken	   by	  Yushchenko	   during	   his	   term	   in	   ofMice	   ultimately	   led	   to	   the	   Russian	   government	   applying	  economic	  pressures	  on	  the	  state.	  In	  both	  2006	  and	  2009,	  natural	  gas	  was	  cut	  off	  when	  the	  Ukrainian	  government	  could	  not	  pay	  the	  fourfold	  increase	  in	  price	  that	  Russia	  expected	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  full. 	  While	  Russia	  claimed	  the	  massive	  increase	  in	  natural	  gas	  was	  the	  result	  of	  27market	  considerations,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  the	  price	  of	  gas	  that	  Russia	  delivered	  to	  Belarus	  or	  Trans-­‐Dniester	  region	  did	  not	  change	  in	  this	  same	  period	  of	  time. 	  28One	   of	   the	  most	   contentious	   issues	   that	   has	   plagued	   the	  U.S.-­‐Russian	   relationship	  since	   the	   early	   2000’s	   has	   been	   the	   U.S.’s	   desire	   to	   establish	   a	   Ballistic	   Missile	   Defence	  shield	   in	  Europe.	  Seen	  as	  a	  way	   to	  protect	   the	  U.S.	   from	   ‘rogue	  actors’,	  Russia	  has	  viewed	  this	   move	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   its	   national	   defence	   and	   a	   way	   for	   the	   West	   to	   counteract	   the	  advantage	  Russia	  has	  in	  nuclear	  armed	  ballistic	  missiles.	  Out	  of	  this	  desire	  for	  security,	  both	  states	   have	   stepped	   away	   from	   international	   agreements	   on	   nuclear	  missile	   deployment	  and	  arms	   treaties	  as	  a	  way	   to	  protect	   themselves	   from	   international	   threats.	  The	  U.S.	  has	  stepped	   away	   from	   the	   Anti-­‐Ballistic	  Missile	   Treaty	   of	   1972	   to	   Mind	   new	  ways	   to	   protect	  itself	  from	  possible	  threats,	  while	  Russia	  has	  backed	  away	  from	  treaties	  on	  the	  deployment	  of	  military	  forces	  in	  Europe	  due	  to	  the	  decisions	  the	  U.S.	  has	  taken.	  While	  both	  states	  have	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made	  these	  decisions	  based	  on	  their	  desire	  to	  guarantee	  their	  security,	   their	  actions	  have	  only	  led	  to	  a	  more	  volatile	  world	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  risk	  of	  confrontation.	  The	   issue	   of	   BMD	  was	   Mirst	   hypothesized	   in	   the	   latter	   years	   of	   the	   1990’s.	  Missile	  tests	   conducted	   by	   North	   Korea	   in	   1998	   led	   to	   serious	   discussion	   in	   the	   U.S.	   about	  establishing	  a	  nuclear	  missile	  defence	  shield	  to	  protect	  itself	  from	  possible	  strikes	  by	  rogue	  states. 	   	  While	   the	   groundwork	  was	   laid,	   the	   technology	  at	   the	   time	  was	   insufMicient	   for	  29progress	   to	   be	   made	   in	   creating	   an	   effective	   program.	   The	   situation	   changed,	   however,	  following	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  as	  the	  U.S.	  looked	  to	  implement	  new	  ways	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	   the	   state	   from	   threats.	  Under	  Bush,	   the	  Anti-­‐Ballistic	  Missile	   treaty	  was	  abrogated,	   the	  BMD	  shield	  was	  brought	  up	  as	  a	  legitimate	  option	  to	  secure	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  counter	  measures	  to	  ballistic	  missile	  strikes	  were	  set	  up	  in	  Alaska	  and	  California. 	  	  Meant	  to	  limit	  the	  amount	  30of	  anti-­‐ballistic	  countermeasures	  that	  were	  active	  at	  a	  time,	  the	  ABM	  Treaty	  was	  abandoned	  by	   the	  U.S.	   so	   that	   it	   could	  work	   on	   building	   up	   its	   defenses	   against	   possible	   strike.	   The	  U.S.’s	   plan	   for	   a	   BMD	   shield	   in	   Europe	   centered	   on	   deploying	   a	   radar	   station	   in	  Czechoslovakia	  and	  ground-­‐based	  interceptors	  in	  Poland. 	  While	  the	  shield	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  31way	  of	  protecting	   the	  U.S.	   from	  possible	   threats,	  notably	  North	  Korea	  or	   Iran,	  Russia	   saw	  this	  action	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  build	  counter	  measures	  to	  Russia’s	  arsenal	  of	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missiles.	  	  The	   proximity	   of	   the	   BMD	   shield	   and	   its	   intended	   purpose	   became	   the	   main	  criticisms	  that	  Russia	  had	  with	  the	  program.	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	   have	   been	   protected	   from	   one	   another	   due	   to	   the	   threat	   of	   ‘Mutually	   Assured	  Destruction’,	   if	  war	  was	  to	  break	  out	  between	  them.	  This	  balance	  of	  power	  based	  on	  MAD	  has	  been	  relatively	  unchanged	  since	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   If	   the	  U.S.	  was	   to	  deploy	   its	  BMD	  shield	  in	  Europe	  then	  this	  balance	  of	  power	  would	  be	  altered	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  shield	   in	  defending	  against	  nuclear	  strikes.	  While	   it	   is	  argued	  that	   the	  shield	   is	  meant	   for	  defensive	  purposes,	  its	  deployment	  would	  also	  alter	  the	  deterrent	  relationship	  that	  Russia	  has	  with	  the	  U.S.	  because	  the	  BMD	  shield	  gives	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  superiority. 	  The	  fact	  that	  32Russia	   relies	   on	   its	   nuclear	   capability	   greatly	   for	   its	   military	   strength	   and	   power	   in	   the	  international	  system	  means	  that	  a	  BMD	  shield	  built	   in	  Europe,	  close	  to	  its	  borders,	  would	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  great	  threat	  to	  its	  power	  projection	  ability.	  To	  regain	  the	  balance	  in	  power,	  Russia	  suspended	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  Treaty	  on	  Conventional	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  Europe	  in	  2007. 	   	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  measure	  is	  that	  Russia	  can	  now	  build	  up	  the	  amount	  of	  heavy	  33weapons	  deployed	  on	  its	  western	  and	  southern	  borders;	  a	  move	  that	  would	  come	  about	  if	  plans	  for	  a	  missile	  defence	  shield	  are	  set	  up	  in	  Europe.	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While	  the	  U.S.	  still	  sees	  the	  shield	  as	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  protect	  itself,	  under	  Obama	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  appease	  Russia	  as	  well	  as	  continuing	  progress	  on	  the	  shield.	  Under	  the	  “reset”	  of	  relations	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  hoping	  for	  with	  Russia,	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  alter	  the	  BMD	  shield	  to	  make	  it	  more	  acceptable	  to	  the	  Russian	  government.	  Under	  Obama’s	  revisions,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   the	   BMD	   shield	  would	   rely	   on	   rapid	   deployment	   of	   a	   sea-­‐based	   platform,	   as	   well	   as	   land	   sites,	   to	   deal	   with	   potential	   inter-­‐continental	   threats. 	  34While	  this	  does,	  to	  some	  degree,	  deal	  with	  Russia’s	  objections	  to	  the	  program,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  between	  both	  sides	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  can	  work	  together	  as	  security	  partners.	  As	   long	   as	   Russia	   relies	   on	   nuclear	   weapons	   as	   a	   deterrent,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   BMD	  program	  can	  continue	  without	  angering	  Russia	  in	  the	  process. 	  	  	  35In	  the	  past	  twenty-­‐Mive	  years,	  the	  working	  relationship	  that	  Russia	  had	  built	  with	  the	  West	   following	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  has	   slowly	  deteriorated	   to	  a	  point	  where	  neither	  side	   is	  willing	   to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other.	  The	   issues	  of	  NATO	  expansion,	   the	  questions	  over	  the	  legality	  of	  Kosovo,	  Russian	  actions	  in	  Georgia	  and	  Ukraine,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  BMD	  shield	  in	  Europe	  have	  all	  contributed	  to	  the	  relationship	  that	  we	  see	  today	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Russia.	  Because	  of	  this	  state	  of	  abysmal	  relations	  that	  have	  developed,	  neither	  side	  is	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  the	  other	  on	  international	  issues	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  trust	  that	  has	  developed.	   One	   of	   the	   international	   issues	   affected	   by	   this	   deterioration	   has	   been	   the	  progress	   that	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   made	   on	   the	   containment	   of	   the	   threat	   of	  nuclear	  war.	  Many	  of	  the	  treaties	  made	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  arms	  control	  have	  been	  abandoned	  by	  both	  sides	  either	  due	  to	  security	  fears	  coming	  from	  a	  changing	  world,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  or	   the	   threat	   that	   speciMic	   issues	   have	   on	   national	   sovereignty	   and	   defence,	   as	   seen	   in	  Russia. 	   	  While	  neither	  side	   is	  at	  complete	  fault	   for	  the	  strained	  relationship	  that	  we	  see	  36today,	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  U.S.	  have	  played	  an	  integral	  part	  in	  the	  deterioration	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  The	  decision	  to	  take	  actions	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  aggressive	  by	  Russia	  without	  consulting	  the	  state	  Mirst,	  or	  creating	  a	  partnership	  on	  several	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  factors,	  has	  not	  only	  upset	  the	  Russian	  government	  but	  has	  led	  it	  to	  become	  more	   aggressive	   in	   its	   foreign	   policy	   directives.	   The	  world	   that	  we	   live	   in	   today,	  whereby	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	  once	  again	  see	  each	  other	  as	  their	  respective	  enemy	  and	  the	  conMlict	  in	  Ukraine	  continues,	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  regards	  to	  Russia	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  dealt	  with.	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